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Abstract 
The recent volatility in oil energy markets invites us to re-assess the impact of oil prices changes 
on the macroeconomic environment. The Great Recession of 2007-2009 led to closer monitoring 
of global housing markets by regulators and market participants. Employing a structural vector 
autoregressive model, we find that the reaction of housing markets to oil price shocks varies 
significantly depending on whether the change in oil prices is prompted by demand or supply 
shocks in the oil market and on country oil trading status (i.e. net importer or net exporter). Our 
results are robust to the inclusion of different macroeconomic channels through which oil shocks 
may influence housing prices and control for restricted dynamic feedback effects. We also study 
the role of the phases of the housing cycle. 
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1. Introduction 
The booming U.S. real estate market during the early to mid-2000’s lured many investors 
(and their funding sources) in the financial markets to partake in unwarranted amounts of financial 
leverage and risk that inflated housing prices around the globe. The inflated asset values were not 
unique to the housing markets, commodities (including oil) and equity markets also reached all-
time highs. The 2007-2009 financial crisis that emerged from various factors including the housing 
boom, aggressive mortgage lending activity, financial innovation, historically low interest rates, 
and increased access to money and capital markets culminated with unprecedented U.S. 
government intervention in the financial sector.  Some scholars (e.g. Luciani, 2015) claim that 
from the financial market, the contagion spread to the real economy and the remainder of the world 
leading to a severe global recession. 
When contrasted to the U.S housing market, the Canadian housing market seems 
unaffected by the 2007-2009 financial crisis; it remains on the rise and hence has received renewed 
attention from a variety of interested parties both in Canada and from abroad (refer to Figure 1). 
The Economist’s analysis of housing prices conducted in 2014 suggests that Canadian property 
values in 2012 were reported at roughly 75% above their long-run fair value while current property 
values continue to hold close to these metrics. Khiabani (2015) points out that in the last decade, 
many oil exporting countries have experienced an unusually sharp increase in housing prices which 
is accompanied by a period of high oil inflows in these countries. Interestingly, the direct 
relationship between world oil supply and housing prices is much stronger in Canadian (a net oil 
exporter) compared to the U.S. (a net oil importer) in our sample data as seen in Figure 1.  
[Figure 1, about here] 
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An interesting area of recent research examines the impact of energy prices on real estate 
markets (e.g. Antonakakis et al., 2016; Breitenfellner et al., 2015; and Khiabani, 2015). The 
current literature generally suggests that increases in oil prices negatively impact the real estate 
market. While this literature sheds new light on the impact of oil prices on housing, it fails to 
distinguish the impact caused by supply side versus demand side oil shocks. This study explores 
the following research questions: 1) Does housing price behavior differ in response to the nature 
of the oil price shock?; 2) Do oil shock effects on the housing market vary based on the country 
oil trading status (i.e. net importer or net exporter)?; and 3) Does the response to oil shocks 
depend on the phase of the housing cycle? Examining the impact of oil shocks is particularly 
relevant since according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) real estate accounts for 
roughly a third of the total assets held by the nonfinancial private sector in the U.S.  Figures from 
Statistics Canada suggests that in 2015 approximately 13% of GDP was associated with real 
estate. Understanding real estate markets is, therefore, imperative for market participants, 
regulators, and consumers. The increasing significance that energy prices have on economies and 
asset prices is also of great importance not only to academics but to policy makers around the 
globe as well (e.g. 9.5% of Canada’s GDP was associated with the oil/energy sector). According 
to Hamilton (2011), ten of eleven post-war U.S. recessions were preceded by oil price shocks. In 
addition, nine of those eleven recessions followed shocks in the housing market. 
We focus our attention on two similar but distinct markets: Canada and the U.S. 
Although the two countries share one of the longest land borders in the world, their economic 
structures are quite different.  Canada is generally referred to as a small open economy whereas 
the U.S. is generally accepted as a large and relatively closed economy. The two economies 
exhibit strong interdependencies through the financial sector as suggested by Ambler 
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(1989) and Schmitt-Grohé (1998), which creates an interesting scenario for our research. As 
mentioned previously, the respective economies have weathered the past decade of global market 
fluctuations in very different fashions. Additionally, and of great importance to this study, 
Canada is a net oil exporter whereas the U.S. is historically a net oil importer. According to the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIAA), the U.S. was the largest importer of oil in 2012 
at 7.39 million barrel of oil per day.1  Historically, Canada has been a net exporter and figures in 
2012 show that Canada’s net exports for the year were 2.47 million barrel of oil per day.2  Over 
70% of Canadian oil extracted is exported to the U.S. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we empirically investigate 
the impact of oil shocks on housing markets employing SVAR construction introduced by Kilian 
(2009) who disentangles demand and supply oil shocks to explore their impact on the U.S. macro 
economy. Secondly, we apply the methodology to two developed countries (Canada and the 
U.S.), to investigate how oil shocks impact oil-exporting countries differently than oil-importing 
countries. Existing literature (e.g. Wang et al., 2013; and Filis and Chatziantoniou, 2014) focus 
on equity and inflation measures, respectively, among oil exporting and oil importing countries. 
Finally, we test the relationship between oil and housing over an updated time frame to 2015 
using data from S&P Case-Shiller index and the National Bank House Price index. The time of 
this study captures substantial housing and oil price fluctuations. 
Our findings indicate that the nature of the oil shock (supply vs. demand) matters when 
determining how the housing market reacts to shifts in oil prices. Further, this finding is much 
more relevant to our oil-exporting country (Canada) as opposed to the oil-importing country 
(U.S.). Specifically, oil shocks that originate from world aggregate demand shocks account for 
                                                          
1 https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=709&t=6  2 https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/nrg/sttstc/crdlndptrlmprdct/stt/crdlsmmr/2013/smmry2013-eng.html 
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approximately 5% (1.5%) of the variance in the Canadian (U.S.) housing sector 12 months after 
the shock. Oil-specific shocks account for approximately 18% (7%) of the variance in housing 
prices in Canada (U.S.) after 12 months.  The results remain robust to inclusion of different 
macroeconomic channels (i.e., interest rates, unemployment, industrial production, and the 
U.S./CAD exchange rate) through which oil shocks may influence housing prices. We also 
control for dynamic feedback effects and account for the phases of the housing cycle.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines relevant literature 
related to oil and housing markets. Section 3 describes the variables, data and sources, and 
presents data descriptive statistics, while Section 4 introduces the methodology employed. The 
empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6 we present our 
conclusion.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Oil Prices  There is extensive literature documenting the impact oil shocks have on macroeconomic 
variables and equity markets. The seminal work of Hamilton (1983) indicates that oil price 
shocks have an impact on the U.S. macro economy (i.e., unemployment, real GNP, implicit price 
deflator for non-farm business income, wages, import prices, and money supply). Since then, 
Sadorsky (1999) investigates the U.S. equity markets and finds that positive shocks to oil prices 
depress real stock returns. Park and Ratti (2009) find that oil price shocks account for a 
statistically significant 6% of the volatility in real stock returns for their sample of 13 European 
countries and the U.S. Further, and contrary to the other countries, they find that Norway (an oil 
exporting country) shows a positive response of real stock returns to oil price increases.  
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 Kilian (2009) brought new methodological insight by disentangling supply and demand 
factors within oil shocks. Using this new methodological approach, Kilian and Park (2009) 
conclude that demand and supply shocks driving the global crude oil market jointly account for 
22% of the long-run variation in U.S. real stock returns. They also find that the response of 
aggregate stock returns differs greatly depending on the cause of the oil price shock.  
Other studies examine various industry and regional responses to oil price shocks.   
Nandha and Faff (2008) find that increases in oil price have a negative impact on equity returns 
for all sectors except mining and oil and gas industries.  Elyasiani et al. (2011) investigate the 
effects of changes in oil futures returns and volatility on excess stock returns and volatility of 
thirteen U.S. industries employing a multi-index asset pricing model with Fama-French factors 
and GARCH methodology.  They conclude that oil price fluctuations constitute a systematic 
asset price risk at the industry level on nine of the thirteen industries included in their sample. 
Elyasiani et al. (2013) re-examine their 2011 research by applying double-threshold FIGARCH 
approach to their multi-index asset pricing model. Their data rejects the more restricted GARCH, 
IGARCH, and Fama-French models in favor of FIGARCH modeling. They explain that their 
FIGARCH model captures not only short-run dynamics but also long-run persistent patterns of 
oil shocks effects that may decay at a slower hyperbolic pace.  Wang et al. (2013) find that the 
response of stock market returns to oil price shocks in a country greatly depend on the country’s 
net position in the crude oil market and on the driving forces of oil price shocks.  They also find 
that the total contribution of oil price shocks to variations in stock market returns depend on the 
relative importance of oil to the country’s national economy. Filis and Chatziantoniou (2014) 
also distinguish between net oil-importing and net oil-exporting countries and their results 
indicate that the level of inflation and equity markets in both net oil-exporting and net oil-
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importing countries is significantly affected by oil price innovations. They show that in response 
to oil shocks, inflation increases for oil exporting and oil importing countries. Also, stock 
markets exhibit a negative response to oil shocks with the exception of Norway (oil exporting 
country). 
2.2 Housing Market 
The research on the housing market has gained significant interest in the past decade as new 
data sources such as the Case-Shiller Housing indices have become available. Further, increased 
attention has been given to the housing markets around the globe as a result of the real estate 
market turmoil that evolved during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Schembri (2015) outlines 
some of the factors that may influence housing price trends.  He explains that many real estate 
assets serve as consumption goods and as financial assets that accumulate wealth; therefore, 
several different factors can play a role in demand and supply for homes. Academic literature 
documents the relationship between the housing market and the macro economy. Case (2000) 
and Catte et al. (2004), among others, have investigated macroeconomic shocks (i.e., money 
supply, industrial production, or interest rates) on U.S. house prices. Mishkin (2007), Goodhart 
and Hofmann (2008), and Vargas-Silva (2008), amongst others, focus on the relationship 
between monetary policy and the housing markets.  
2.3 Link between Oil and Real Estate Markets  
Chan et al. (2011) examine the relationships between three different asset classes: financial 
assets (U.S. stocks and Treasury bonds), commodities (oil and gold) and real estate (U.S. 
housing) assets. Using a Markov switching model they find that investors shift their capital 
between these three different asset classes depending on the state of the economy (e.g. tranquil 
versus crisis). Recently, some attention has focused on the impact of energy prices on real estate 
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markets. Antonakakis, et al. (2016) reveal that comovements between U.S. housing and oil 
market returns are consistently negative over time.  Breitenfellner, et al. (2015) examine 18 
OCED economies and suggest that increases in energy price inflation raise the probability of 
housing price corrections. They argue that their findings could potentially be attributed to five 
theoretical linkages. First, they suggest adverse direct and indirect effects of energy price 
increases on personal income and expenditures of households resulting in reduced demand for 
housing (income effect). Second, the impact increased energy prices have on construction and 
building costs which lead to quantity and supply adjustments on the supply side. Third, the 
tightening reaction of monetary policy on the pressure induced by increased energy prices have 
on inflation which first withdraws liquidity from the housing market and then reduces aggregate 
demand, including housing demand (Luciani, 2015). Fourth, as in Chan et al. (2011) the 
attractiveness of the energy sector in terms of investment returns compared to housing sector 
may alter the flow of funds into either asset category and thus influence prices. Finally, lagging 
impacts of common factors on both variables such as economic growth or monetary policy.  
Hamilton (2009) argues that the adverse effects of oil shocks on income and unemployment 
depress housing demand significantly and Kilian (2008) concludes that energy price shocks 
make themselves felt primarily via demand for cars and new homes. Others have also provided 
evidence of linkages between the energy and real estate markets in different fashions. Kaufmann, 
et al. (2011) suggests that rising energy prices constrain consumer budgets and thereby raise 
mortgage delinquency rates. This increase in mortgage delinquency is associated with falling 
home prices, an increase in household expenditures on energy, and rising unemployment. 
Khiabani (2015) focuses on identifying the channels for the transmission of oil price and credit 
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shocks to the housing sector in the Iranian market. The findings indicate that oil price shocks 
explain a substantial part of housing market fluctuations in Iran.  
The main advantage of our SVAR approach over previous work (e.g., Chan et al., 2011; 
Antonakakis et al., 2016; Breitenfellner et al., 2015; Khiabani, 2015) is that the identification 
structure allows us to assess the impact of higher crude oil prices differentiating the demand and 
supply shocks, along with the relative importance of these shocks over time. In addition, 
previous studies treat oil as exogenous with respect to the real estate market. 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
The data used in this study consists of monthly observations during the period from 
January 1994 to November 2015.  We use the Canadian real estate data obtained via the National 
Bank House Price Index.3 For the U.S. we use the National S&P/Case Shiller index as our 
measure for aggregate housing prices.4  These indices are then divided by the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) of each respective country to get the inflation-adjusted real values. The Canadian 
CPI data is extracted from Statistics Canada’s (CANSIM) website http://www.statcan.gc.ca/start-
debut-eng.html (last accessed on 4/30/16), while the U.S. CPI data is collected from the Federal 
Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database available through the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint 
Louis https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ (last accessed on 4/30/16). 
As a proxy for world oil price level, we use monthly price data of West Texas 
Intermediate (WTI). We choose WTI over Brent and Dubai oil prices due to the fact that this 
                                                          3 The Teranet – National Bank House Price Index™ is an independent representation of the rate of change of Canadian single-family home prices. http://www.housepriceindex.ca/default.aspx  last accessed on 01/15/2016. Limited to 02/1999 to 11/2015. 4 The S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices are the leading measures of U.S. residential real estate prices, tracking changes in the value of residential real estate both nationally as well as in 20 metropolitan regions. http://ca.spindices.com/index-family/real-estate/sp-case-shiller  last accessed 01/15/2016. 
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study focuses two countries in North America. Also alternative proxies for oil prices such as 
Brent and Dubai oil have shown to have extremely high correlations with WTI suggesting that 
the results of this study would not be altered by using alterative oil proxies.  WTI price data are 
collected from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database and then divided by the 
U.S. CPI to get the inflation-adjusted real oil prices.  
We use monthly global oil production data collected from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administrate (EIA) website as our measure for world oil supply.  Data for global real economic 
activity is proxied through the global index of dry cargo single voyage freight rates, created by 
Kilian (2009).5 This data source has been used extensively throughout the existing research as an 
estimate for the scale of global economic activity created to capture across-the-board shifts in the 
global demand for industrial commodities including oil.6   
To capture macroeconomic factors of each respective country we collect data on interest 
rates, unemployment, U.S. industrial production and the U.S./CAD exchange.  For the Canadian 
sample, we use the Bank Rate as a proxy for monetary policy changes. We retrieved these data 
from Statistics Canada table 176-0043. The unemployment rate and the US/CAD foreign 
exchange rate is also obtained via Statistic Canada, tables 282-0087 and 176-0064 respectively. 
For the U.S. sample, the federal funds rate, the unemployment rate, and industrial production 
were retrieved from the U.S. Federal Reserve Economic Database hosted by the St. Louis 
Federal Reserve Bank.  
[Table 1, about here]  
                                                          5 Index data from http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/  last accessed on 01/26/2016. 6  See for example, Jung and Park (2011), Basher et al. (2012), Wang and Yang (2013), among others. 
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Panels A and B from Table 1 report the descriptive statistics for our Canadian and U.S. 
housing variables as well as on our additional model variables. Some of the series are moderately 
skewed and tests on the shapes of the distributions indicate that the series are leptokurtic (i.e. 
implying that they exhibit higher peaks, higher kurtosis, compared to a normal distribution).  
Results from the Jarque-Bera tests reject the null of an underlying normal distributions for all of 
the series. With a sample size of 263 observations for the U.S. and 201 for the Canadian sample, 
the implication of the central limit theorem, non-normality is not a concern for the validity of the 
results.7 Panels C and D on Table 1 show the unit root tests of included variables. We include the 
augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979) test along with the modified augmented Dickey Fuller test 
proposed by Elliott et al. (1996). The results indicate that all the series included are consistent 
with an I(1) process (i.e. the series have a unit root in levels but are stationary when first-
differenced).  
[Table 2, about here] 
Table 2 reports the correlation matrix for the series of interest to this study. The U.S. 
housing market price index (U.S.) shows a moderately weaker yet positive relationship with 
crude oil prices (OIL) and world supply of oil (W-S) with correlations of 0.461 and 0.532 (see 
Panel  B), accordingly compared to correlations of 0.757 and 0.964 between OIL and W-S, 
respectively, with the Canadian housing price index (CAN), refer to Panel A.  Of interest is the 
moderate and negative correlation of -0.104 between the Canadian housing price index and 
global real economic activity W-D which may suggest that housing markets thrive under 
different economic conditions compared to other asset classes.  Another interesting relationship 
is reflected between OIL and Unemployment which reflects a positive correlation of 0.512 for 
                                                          7 See Woolridge (1994). 
  
12  
the U.S. sample (see Panel B) versus negative -0.215 for the Canadian sample (see Panel A). 
This result is intuitive given the major differences in the country’s dependence on oil markets. 
 
4. Methodology 
Drawing from the framework established by Kilian (2009) and Kilian and Park (2009), 
we investigate how Canadian and U.S. housing price indices respond to demand and supply 
shocks in the global crude oil market. Their research suggests that the impact of demand and 
supply shocks in the crude oil market on U.S. macroeconomic aggregates are qualitatively 
different, depending on whether oil price increases are triggered by oil production shortfalls, a 
booming world economy, or shifts in precautionary demand for crude oil that reflect heightened 
concerns about future oil supply shortfalls. It is plausible that the effect of these shocks on 
housing prices may, to some extent, vary based on the role of the housing market in the 
macroeconomy. Researchers have found that global business expansion tends to raise the price of 
crude oil. Economic shocks that power macroeconomic aggregates (and conceivably housing 
markets) may also influence crude oil prices which makes it challenging to isolate cause and 
effect when examining the relationship between oil and housing prices. Building on a structural 
vector autoregression (SVAR) model introduced by Killian (2010) we propose an SVAR model 
that connects U.S. and Canadian housing price indices (under separate estimations) to measures 
of demand and oil supply shocks in the global crude oil market.      
The structural VAR model is expressed as follows: 
ܣ଴ ݖ௧ =  ܽ଴ +  ∑ ܣ௜ݖ௧ି௜ +  ߝ௧௝௜ୀଵ       (1) 
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where ݖ௧ represents a time series vector of the following variables: 1) global oil production (W-
St) expressed in logarithm form, 2) the Kilian (2009) index measuring global real economic 
activity (W-Dt,), 3) real price of crude oil (OILt,) introduced in logarithmic form, and 4) the 
logarithm of inflation adjusted housing price indices for the Canadian and U.S. markets (CAN t 
and U.S.t, respectively). The variables in the ݖ௧  vector enter the model in first difference. ܣ଴,  
ܽ଴, and ܣ௜ are vectors of intercept terms and coefficients while ߝ௧ represents a vector of serially 
and mutually uncorrelated structural innovations.  We allow ݁௧ to represent our reduced-form 
VAR innovations so that ݁௧ = ܣ௢ି ଵߝ௧.  By imposing exclusion restrictions consistent with those 
introduced by Kilian and Park (2009) on the ܣ௢ି ଵ  matrix of coefficients, we are able to derive 
structural innovations from reduced-form innovations. The lag length j in equation (1) is chosen 
to be two as determined by the Schwarz Bayesian information criterion (BIC).8 
Our model imposes a block-recursive structure on the contemporaneous relationship 
between reduced-form and underlying structural disturbances. The initial block establishes a 
model for the global crude oil market while the second block consists of the macroeconomic 
channel and our housing price indices. In the initial block ߝଵ௧ symbolizes shocks to the global 
supply of crude oil (“oil supply shock”), ߝଶ௧ expresses shocks to the global demand for all 
industrial commodities (including oil) that are powered by global real economic activity 
(“aggregate demand shock”), and ߝଷ௧ represents an oil-market specific demand shock. This third 
shock is intended to capture shifts in precautionary demand for crude oil in reaction to increase 
uncertainty regarding future oil supply shortages (“oil-specific demand shock”). For our fourth 
shock, ߝସ௧, we will use different macroeconomic variables potentially affected by oil and that at 
the same time can influence housing prices. Finally, in the housing price indices block, we have 
                                                          8 Using alternative lag lengths (4 or 6) does not significantly alter our findings.  
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only one structural innovation for each index ߝହ௧. In this second block, we refer to the shocks as 
innovations to housing price indices not driven by global crude oil demand or supply shocks. We 
do not attempt to unravel further structural shocks driving housing prices since our work focuses 
on the impact of structural shocks in the crude oil market on two housing markets.  
 Our model imposes identifying assumptions resulting in a recursively identified structural 
model of the following form: 
݁௧= 
ۉ
ۈۈ
ۈۇ
݁ଵ,௧△௚௟௢௕௔௟ ௢௜௟ ௣௥௢ௗ௨௖௧௜௢௡ 
݁ଶ,௧௚௟௢௕௔௟ ௥௘௔௟ ௔௖௧௜௩௜௧௬ 
݁ଷ,௧௥௘௔௟ ௢௜௟ ௣௥௜௖௘݁ସ,௧௠௔௖௥௢௘௖௢௡௢௠௜௖ ௖௛௔௡௡
݁ହ,௧∆௥௘௔௟ ௛௢௨௦௜  ௣௥௜௖௘ ی
ۋۋ
ۋۊ = 
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍܽଵଵ 0 0 0 0ܽଶଵ ܽଶଶ 0 0 0ܽଷଵ ܽଷଶ ܽଷଷ 0 0ܽସଵ ܽସଶ ܽସଷ ܽସସ 0ܽହଵ ܽହଶ ܽହଷ ܽହସ ܽହହےۑ
ۑۑ
ې
 
ۉ
ۈۈ
ۈۇ
ߝଵ,௧௢௜௟ ௦௨௣௣௟௬ ௦௛௢௖௞
ߝଶ,௧ ௔௚௚௥௘௚௔௧௘ ௗ௘௠௔௡ௗ ௦௛௢௖௞
ߝଷ,௧  ௢௜௟ି௦௣௘௖௜௙  ௗ௘௠௔௡ௗ ௦௛௢௖௞ߝସ.௧௠௔௖௥௢௘௖௢௡௢௠௜௖ ௖௛௔௡௡  ௦௛௢௖௞ߝହ.௧௢௧௛௘௥ ௛௢௨௦௜௡௚ି௦௣௘௖௜௙௜௖ ௦௛௢௖௞ ی
ۋۋ
ۋۊ     (2) 
The three exclusion restrictions in the initial block of equation (2) are consistent with a vertical 
short-run global supply curve of crude oil and a downward sloping demand curve as suggested 
by Kilian (2009). Shifts of the demand curve driven by either of the two demand shocks yield a 
contemporaneous change in the real price of oil as do unanticipated oil supply shocks that would 
shift the vertical supply curve. These restrictions were motivated by Kilian (2009) and Kilian 
(2010) as follows: 1) crude oil supply will not respond to oil demand shocks within the month 
due to the costs of adjusting oil production and the uncertainty regarding the state of the crude oil 
market, 2) increases in the real price of oil powered by oil-market specific shocks will not reduce 
concurrent global real economic activity given the sluggish nature of global real activity, and 3) 
shocks to the real price of oil that are not explained by oil supply or aggregate demand shocks to 
industrial  commodities must be oil market specific demand shocks. Moreover, in the second 
block we have that, 4) other-housing specific shocks do not affect the macroeconomic channel 
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within the same month. Finally, 5) shocks to the macroeconomic channel may affect housing 
prices within the same month. 
 For the macroeconomic channel, we will use the Federal Funds Fate (U.S.), the Bank 
Rate (Canada), unemployment, U.S. industrial production, and the U.S./CAN exchange rate. The 
idea is that the transmission of oil shocks to the housing market might work through these 
channels. Modeling the channel is important for the interpretation of the oil shocks as structural 
shocks as potential macroeconomic factors that affect housing prices can be contemporaneously 
correlated with oil shocks. Note than rather than including various channel in the same 
estimation, we pursue a parsimonious model and provide various robustness checks with 
different channels including them one by one.   
The block-recursive structure of our model implies that global crude oil production, 
global real economic activity, and the real price of oil are treated as predetermined with respect 
to the macroeconomic channel and our housing prices indices. Therefore, while the housing price 
indices are allowed to respond to oil demand and supply shocks on impact, our assumption is 
that ߝହ௧ does not impact global crude oil production, global real economic activity, the real price 
of oil, and the macroeconomic channel within a given month, but only with a delay of at least 
one month. It is plausible to accept that oil producers would not be immediately influenced by 
fluctuations in housing prices given the existence of a monopoly in the oil market (OPEC) in 
which oil supply is mostly exogenously managed by several large producers. The sluggish nature 
of global real economic activity would support our conjecture that changes in housing prices in 
Canada or the U.S. would not produce an immediate impact on global economic activity. While 
housing price changes could conceivably yield wealth effects that conceivably impact 
consumption, housing construction (labor and material inputs) and home sales would seem to be 
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the elements that would generate more palpable economic activity. Since “precautionary 
demand” arises from the uncertainty about future shortfalls of expected oil supply relative to 
expected oil demand it is conceivable that oil prices do not immediately respond to housing price 
innovations. Finally, shocks classified as ‘other housing-specific shocks’ may be caused by many 
factors related to housing which cannot be explained by the macroeconomic channel or the 
previous three oil related shocks. Depending on the macroeconomic channel, these may include 
credit conditions, demographic changes, and regulatory changes in each respective country.   
5. Results 
5.1. Responses of Canadian housing market to world oil price shocks 
 Figure 2 reports the response of Canadian housing prices to oil supply shocks, aggregate 
demand shocks, and other oil-specific demand shocks. The reduced form VAR specification was 
estimated with two lags, as obtained by the Bayesian Information Criteria. Moreover, this initial 
benchmark model does not include any macroeconomic channel. These impulse response 
functions (IRFs) show that oil supply shock and aggregate demand shocks do not have any 
statistically significant effect on the path of prices. However, other oil-specific demand shocks 
have a positive and statistically significant effect on prices starting on the second month up until 
about month eight. This shock appears to elicit a peak housing price increase of approximately 
two percent by the third month and then gradually fades away. The direct effect of the other oil-
specific demand shock on housing prices initially appears at odds with Kilian and Park (2009) 
who document negative impact of the shock on equity markets. However, with Canada being an 
oil exporting economy, our response aligns with their interpretation that industry-level stock 
return response patterns are consistent with the view that oil shocks are predominantly shocks to 
the demand for industries’ products as opposed to industry production cost shocks.  These 
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authors suggest that oil shocks are viewed as adverse aggregate demand shocks for an oil 
importing economy such as the U.S.9 
[Figure 2, about here] 
One limitation from the IRF in Figure 2 is that there can be macroeconomic factors that 
affect housing prices and that are correlated with the oil shocks. Then we might mistakenly 
assign the effect on prices on a particular oil shock when in fact it is coming from an omitted 
variable. Following the structure in Equation (2), we report in Figure 3 three specifications of 
macroeconomic channels. We have the Bank Rate, the unemployment rate and the exchange rate. 
The results across all three specifications are quantitatively the same as the ones reported in 
Figure 2; oil supply and aggregate demand shocks have no effect on prices.10 In addition, oil-
specific demand shocks have a positive effect on prices between the second and about the 6th or 
7th month after the shock. 
[Figure 3, about here] 
Kilian (2009) suggests that positive shocks in economic activity boost oil demand and 
ultimately generate oil price shocks. Carr and Beese (2008) claim that the rising price of oil 
between 2004 and 2007 (period of U.S. economic expansion) led the Federal Reserve to raise 
interest rates which increased payments for those with adjustable mortgages and spurred an 
increase in foreclosures placing downward pressure on housing prices. Hamilton (1983) employs 
VAR methodology and determine that increases in real oil prices “Granger-cause” a series of 
                                                          
9 Elyasiani et al. (2011) and Elyasiani et al. (2013) who examine the impact of oil returns and volatility on industry sector stocks returns in the U.S. applying GARCH and FIGARCH methods to multi-index asset pricing models, find that the level of oil-futures return exerts a greater positive impact on oil-related (Oil and Gas Extraction and Petroleum Refinery) industries. 
10 We additionally used building permits as a macroeconomic channel and found quantitatively similar results. 
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variables related to the business cycle (including unemployment and output) in the U.S. In the 
case of oil exporting countries, Jung and Park (2011) suggest that in the short run to medium run, 
oil-specific demand shocks may exert positive effects (increase in wealth due to increase in oil 
price) although the effect may dampen quickly as the shock reduces global economic activity. 
They also claim that aggregate demand shocks further increases aggregate wealth, consumption, 
and investment for oil-exporting economies which implies lower unemployment. It is 
conceivable that higher unemployment reduces the pool of qualified home buyers which in turn 
places downward pressure on housing demand and prices. The impact of the oil shock on 
Industrial Production depends on the underlying nature of the industry i.e. oil-substitute, oil-
related, and oil-user (refer to Kilian and Park, 2009; Elyasiani et al., 2011; and Elyasiani et al., 
2013).  These authors find that the level oil-futures return do not statistically impact oil user 
industries returns (includes building construction) while oil return volatility risk does. The 
implication is that the oil user sector benefits from increased oil price volatility once the oil price 
level is accounted for. Khiabani (2015) posits that oil windfalls to oil-exporting countries 
commonly leads to the accumulation of foreign reserves. A non-sterilization of these reserves 
potentially expands the country’s monetary base which may prompt an increase in the price of 
non-tradable goods (including housing) and an appreciation of real exchange rates.11 
5.2. Dynamic feedback and the housing cycle 
Note that the nature of the reduce form VAR of Equation (1) means that all variables are 
treated symmetrically. When moving to the structural VAR we impose identification restrictions 
                                                          11 For modelling purposes we include industrial production as a macroeconomic channel in the U.S. sample since U.S. is considered an oil-importing country. We use U.S./CAN exchange rate as a macroeconomic channel in the Canadian model since Canada is a net oil-exporting country, a small open economy, and oil prices are in U.S. dollars. Our application of these two channels is consistent with the literature (see Hamilton, 1983; Kilian and Park, 2009; and Khiabani, 2015).  
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that eliminates a potential contemporaneous effect from housing prices to oil markets. However, 
the estimation still allows for a dynamic feedback from lagged housing prices to the oil markets. 
While this flexibility might be important for the U.S housing market, we might not need it for the 
Canadian real estate as this one is smaller and less likely to affect the oil markets. The trade-off 
we face is having a more flexible model at the expense of having to estimate more coefficients. 
To assess whether restricting the dynamic feedback changes our results, Figure 4 presents the 
IRFs of the unrestricted dynamic feedback model (same as in Figure 2) and the restricted 
dynamic feedback model.12 The IRFs show that the shocks of the restricted model follow nearly 
the same path as the shocks of the unrestricted model.  
[Figure 4, about here] 
A major feature in real estate markets and in price dynamics is the existence of cycles and 
price bubbles (see, e.g., Damianov and Escobari, 2016). A potential question that arises when 
studying the role of oil markets on real estate price dynamics is whether the phase of the housing 
cycle plays a role. In particular, we are interested in assessing whether the response to oil shocks 
depend on the phase of the housing cycle. One challenge we face is the identification of the 
housing cycle, as there is no unique approach to empirically identify and label the phases. We 
follow the methods in Harding and Pagan (2002) to obtain the dates of local maxima and local 
minima in the pricing series to then identify the periods from troughs to peaks (recovery and 
expansion) and from peaks to troughs (hypersupply and recession). 
[Figure 5, about here]  
                                                          12 The restricted model is obtained by setting all the lags of the real housing prices in the first three equations (i.e., global oil production, global real activity, and real oil price) to be equal to zero. Simple Granger causality tests on the unrestricted model fail to reject the null hypothesis of no Granger causality in all three cases. That is, real housing prices do not Granger cause any of the three components that characterize the oil market. 
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After identifying the troughs to peaks and the peaks to troughs periods, we create 
dummies for each and interact them one at the time with the Canadian pricing index. The 
resulting series allow us to estimate two additional structural VAR specifications that will 
capture the potentially differentiated effects during troughs to peaks versus peaks to troughs. 
Figure 5 presents the estimated IRFs. The shocks from oil supply still have no statistically 
significant effect on housing prices. However, unlike the previous estimates, shocks from the 
aggregate demand have a statistically significant positive effect on prices during peaks to 
troughs; however, the effect is economically negligible. For the oil-specific demand shocks the 
previous results hold, but the positive effect on prices is about twice as large during recoveries 
and expansions. The estimates presented in Figure 5 can also be interpreted as asymmetric 
pricing, in which the asymmetry is a function of the phase of the housing cycle.13  
[Table 3, about here]  Table 3 presents the forecast-error variance decompositions for our housing price time 
series variable using unemployment as the macroeconomic channel. We can observe that oil 
supply and aggregate demand shocks have little to no influence on aggregate housing prices in 
Canada. However, when focusing on other oil-specific shocks, we find that ‘precautionary 
demand’ explains about 10% of the variation in Canadian housing prices at 3 months and about 
18% of the variation in the long run. 
5.3. Responses of U.S. housing market to world oil price shocks  
Figure 6 shows the response of U.S. housing market prices to shocks in oil supply, 
aggregate demand, and other oil-specific demand factors. In this first specification we do not 
                                                          
13 Peltzman (2000) shows that asymmetric pricing (or asymmetric price adjustments), a phenomenon where prices respond more quickly to cost increases than to cost decreases, exists in a large number of markets.   
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include the macroeconomic channel yet. Of the three impulse response functions reported in 
Figure 6, oil-specific demand shocks appear to exhibit the most influence on the path of prices. 
Neither unanticipated disruptions of crude oil production nor an unexpected increase in the 
global demand for industrial commodities, driven by a rise in global economic activity, have a 
statistically significant effect on the short term path of housing prices. Other oil-specific shocks 
(also referred to as “precautionary demand” shocks) exert short-term positive and statistically 
significant effect on U.S. housing prices that lasts about eight months. The effects are however 
weaker when compared to the Canadian results. This may lend support to the findings of Wing 
(2008) who suggests the declining susceptibility to oil price shocks is associated with the 
declining energy intensity of the U.S. economy.  
[Figure 6, about here] 
Following the same sequence of robustness checks as in the Canadian market, Figure 7 
presents three additional specifications of Equation (2) using different macroeconomic channels. 
The estimates show that even after controlling for the Federal Funds rate, unemployment, and 
industrial production, the main results hold. Oil supply and aggregate demand shocks have no 
statistically significant effect, while oil-specific demand shocks have nearly the same effect in 
terms of magnitude and persistence as found before. The same is true when restricting the 
dynamic feedback, as can be observed from the IRFs reported in Figure 8.  
[Figure 7, about here] 
[Figure 8, about here] 
Figure 9 separates the U.S. housing pricing dynamics into dynamics during recovery and 
expansion and dynamics during hypersupply and recession. While the results for oil supply 
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found earlier hold, for aggregate demand we find a significant different result. Aggregate 
demand shocks have a positive effect during hypersupply and recessions, while they have a 
negative effect during recoveries and expansions. A plausible explanation is that during 
economic expansions, monetary policy may react by imposing interest rate increase which places 
downward pressure on asset values including housing. Opposite effects would materialize during 
economic contraction. Note that the previous non-significant effect in previous figures make 
sense as is the aggregation of both positive and negative effects that cancel each other out. For 
oil-specific demand shocks we observe a positive effect only during recoveries and expansions. 
[Figure 9, about here] 
[Table 4, about here] 
Table 4 details the forecast-error variance decompositions for our housing price time 
series variable using unemployment as the macroeconomic channel. The results are consistent 
with what we find in our impulse response functions in that most of the forecast error variance is 
explained by oil-specific demand shocks.  Similar to the Canadian results, oil supply and 
aggregate demand shocks have modest effects. Oil-specific shocks account for only 3% of the 
variation in U.S. housing prices at 3 months and about 7% of the variation after 12 months.   
6. Conclusion 
The volatility in energy markets over the recent decades encourage a reassessment of the 
impact of oil price shocks on the various components of macro-economy (including housing). 
The U.S. real estate boom during the early to mid-2000’s created unjustified levels of financial 
leverage and risk taken on by many investors and their funding sources that lead to inflated 
housing prices around the globe. Unlike the U.S. housing market which collapsed in 2007, the 
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Canadian housing market seems unaffected by the 2007-2009 financial crisis as it remains on the 
rise. 
We employ SVAR methodology to relate U.S. and Canadian housing price indices (under 
separate estimations) to measures of demand and oil supply shocks in the global crude oil 
market. We expand our benchmark model to control for macro-economic channels, dynamic 
feedback effects, and the housing cycle.  This research yields empirical evidence that suggests 
the following results. First, evidence from the SVAR model in the U.S. and Canadian samples 
suggest that oil supply shocks along with aggregate demand shocks have little impact on housing 
prices in both markets. Second, other oil-specific shocks (precautionary demand), on the other 
hand, exhibit a more pronounced impact on housing prices in Canada compared to the U.S. 
housing market suggesting that the country’s oil trading status (net importer or net exporter) 
matters. The importance of other oil-specific shocks in our results suggests that a rise in 
uncertainty regarding future oil supply shortfalls, which induces increase oil price volatility, is 
captured through rising housing prices. Elyasiani et al. (2011) explain that in the case of the 
building industry, it is plausible that when oil prices become more volatile, demand for new 
homes strengthens because newer buildings are more energy efficient. Third, we determine that 
our results capture asymmetric pricing when we account the phase of the housing cycle. Oil-
specific demand shocks have a positive effect on prices that is about twice as large during 
recovering and expansions than during episodes of hypersupply and recessions. 
The findings in our paper have important implications for academics, investor, and policy 
makers since the volatility in the energy and housing markets seem to impact each other. Based 
on the expanding popularity of real estate investment opportunities (e.g. REITs, ETFs), 
investment managers should be aware of the root causes of oil shocks (i.e. supply vs. demand 
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driven) and how these shocks may influence their investment decisions while acknowledging the 
country’s oil trading status where the investments are being made.  
 Central banks must focus on the underlying determinants of the price of oil when 
formulating monetary policy in response to energy market shocks. Specifically, precautionary 
demand shocks should be closely monitored during energy market cycles and economic policy 
makers from oil-exporting country may consider tightening monetary policy if precautionary 
demand is the underlying cause of the energy cycle.  From a fiscal policy perspective, 
governments from oil-exporting countries may consider using a portion of the tax revenue 
generated from the energy industry to fund a housing stability reserve to be used in times of 
energy market volatility.  The reserve fund could potentially be used during negative energy 
cycles by providing funds to homeowners via energy tax credits or down payment assistance 
programs to stabilize housing markets in specific oil-exporting regions.   
   It will be important to monitor the changing energy market landscape in the U.S. and 
abroad to investigate how the development in shale oil markets and alternative energy markets 
will impact the effect crude oil markets have on real estate and other financial markets. The 
Canadian housing upward price trends over the last two decades attracts attention especially 
when we look back to the housing boom and subsequent bust experienced in the U.S. housing 
market. Given it role in the economy, housing markets are of key concern to monetary policy 
makers. Expectations of future tightening of monetary policy, for example, could lower the 
expected real rate of housing price appreciation and raise current users cost of capital which 
would exert a decline in housing demand and residential construction. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics Model Variables – Inflation adjusted (Real) Values  
Panel A: Canadian Sample 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis J-B (P-Value) HP-C 201 103.03 20.83 -0.080 1.624 0.00 
OIL 201 54.03 23.03 0.233 2.074 0.00 
W-S 201 83873 5392.62 -0.139 1.891 0.00 
W-D 201 6.452 29.51 0.006 2.076 0.01 
BR 201 2.70 1.63 0.393 1.909 0.00 
UE-C 201 7.14 0.81 0.147 2.606 0.00 
FX 201 1.22 0.20 0.469 1.783 0.00  Panel B: U.S. Sample 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis J-B (P-Value) HP-US 263 120.83 20.57 0.586 2.425 0.00 
OIL 263 44.92 22.95 0.522 2.122 0.00 
W-S 263 81212 6985.17 -0.085 1.891 0.00 
W-D 263 2.561 27.66 0.244 2.342 0.04 
FF 263 2.80 2.34 0.077 1.316 0.00 
UE-US 263 5.98 1.64 1.016 2.968 0.00 
FX 263 1.26    0.19  -0.001 1.652 0.00  Panel C: Canadian Sample (Unit Root Tests) Series Trend ADF(k)  DF-GLS (k)  Determination  HP-C Yes -1.918(4) -1.910(4) I(1) W-S Yes -2.783(3) -2.769(3) I(1) W-D No -2.423(3) -1.895(3) I(1) OIL No -2.381(3) -1.389(3) I(1) BR No  -1.756(4) -2.832(4) I(1) 
UE-C No -4.670(1)**  -3.646(1)** I(1) FX No -1.397 (2) -1.001(2) I(1) ∆HP-C No -6.519(3)*** -4.099(3)*** I(0) ∆W-S No -9.431(2)*** -7.481(3)*** I(0) ∆W-D No -8.363(2)*** -6.974(3)*** I(0) ∆OIL ∆BR  No No -7.208(2)*** -4.598(3)*** -4.468(3)*** -3.769(3)*** I(0) I(0) ∆UE-C No -15.961(0)*** -15.927(0)*** I(0) ∆FX No -8.600(1)*** -7.319(1)*** I(0)           
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Panel D: U.S. Sample (Unit Root Tests) Series Trend ADF(k)  DF-GLS (k)  Determination  HP-US Yes -1.039(3) -0.975(3) I(1) W-S Yes -3.446(2)** -2.818(3)* I(1) W-D No -2.398(3) -2.325(3) I(1) OIL No -2.011(2) -2.424(2) I(1) FF No  -1.588(4) -2.111(4) I(1) UE-US No -1.559(4) -1.512(4) I(1) IP  No -0.809(4) -1.140 (4) I(1) ∆HP-US No -5.964(2)*** -5.718(2)*** I(0) ∆W-S No -10.632(2)*** -8.877(2)*** I(0) ∆W-D No -9.351(2)*** -8.006(2)*** I(0) ∆OIL ∆FF  No No -9.285(1)*** -4.923(3)*** -9.000(1)*** -4.016(3)*** I(0) I(0) ∆UE-US No -4.973(3)*** -4.995(3)*** I(0) ∆IP No -4.327(4)*** -4.136(4)*** I(0) Notes: HP-C represents an aggregate housing price index for Canada known as the Teranet National Bank House Price Index. OIL denotes the price (dollars per barrel) of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil.  W-S consists of world oil supply measured by global oil production expressed in millions of barrels pumped per day and averaged by month collected from the U.S. Energy Information Administrate (EIA) website. W-D represents global real economic activity (aggregate demand) and is obtained through the global index of dry cargo single voyage freight rates created by Kilian (2009). Kilian’s index is constructed from an equally-weighted index of percentage change growth rates of a panel of single voyage freight rates measured in dollars per metric ton. BR denotes the bank overnight-discount rate set by the Bank of Canada. UE-C represents unemployment rate in Canada. FX represents the USD/CAD exchange rate. HP-US is an aggregate housing price index for U.S. known as the S&P/Case Shiller Index.  FF represents the federal funds rate set by the U.S. Federal Reserve. UE-US is the unemployment rate in the U.S. All variables are on a monthly frequency; U.S. sample covers from 1994M1 to 2015M11 and CAN sample from 1999M2 to 2015M11.  Canadian and U.S. CPI indices were used to convert housing indices and oil nominal prices to real values.   ∆ denotes first-difference of each respective variable. ADF (k) refers to the 3Augmented Dickey-Fuller t-tests for unit roots and DF-GLS (K) refers to the modified ADF test proposed by Elliott, et al. (1996). Both have a null hypothesis that propose the series have a unit root and (k) refers to the lag length and is selected by the Schwarz Bayesian information criterion (BIC). *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.       
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Table 2 – Correlation Matrices Model Variables  Panel A: Canadian Sample 
 HP-C OIL W-S W-D BR UE-C FX HP-C 1.000       
OIL 0.757 1.000      
W-S 0.964 0.712 1.000     
W-D -0.104 0.247 -0.138 1.000    BR  -0.725  -0.427     - -0.686 0.238 1.000   UE-C -0.103 -0.215 -0.139 -0.263 -0.396 1.000  
FX -0.834 -0.901-0.1901 -0.787 -0.266 0.528 0.147 1.000  Panel B: U.S. Sample  
 HP-US OIL W-S W-D FF UE-US IP HP-US 1.000       
OIL 0.461 1.000      
W-S 0.532 0.781 1.000     
W-D 0.582 0.350 0.040 1.000    FF  -0.223  -0.561 -0.710 0.073 1.000   UE-US -0.096 0.512 0.441 0.025 -0.748 1.000  
IP -0.427 -0.642 -0.654 0.038 0.772 -0.849 1.000 Note: All variables are in levels. Refer to Table 1 for a detailed description of the variables and their source. The correlations are computed for the entire sample period: Canadian Sample from 1999M2 to 2015M11 and U.S. Sample from 1994M1 to 2015M11  
   Table 3 – Canadian Forecast-error Variance Decomposition 
 Impulse Variable Months Oil Supply Shock Aggregate Demand Shock Other Oil-Specific Shock Real Estate Specific Shock 1 0.013 0.000 0.029 0.954 2 0.010 0.011 0.033 0.910 3 0.010 0.029 0.097 0.809 6 0.009 0.050 0.175 0.720 12 0.009 0.052 0.184 0.710 ∞ 0.009 0.052 0.184 0.710 The response variable is the real value National Bank House Price Index as a proxy for aggregate housing prices in the Canada. Oil supply shock refers to the oil supply measured by global oil production data collected from the U.S. Energy Information Administrate (EIA). Aggregate demand shock is tied to the global real economic activity variable and is obtained through the global index of dry cargo single voyage freight rates, created by Kilian (2009). Other oil-specific shock is associated with the real price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil. Real estate specific shock is a shock in the National Bank House Price Index.        
  
33  
Table 4 – U.S. Forecast-error Variance Decomposition 
 Impulse Variable Months Oil Supply Shock Aggregate Demand Shock Other Oil-Specific Shock Real Estate Specific Shock 1 0.000 0.014 0.043 0.941 2 0.000 0.013 0.030 0.954 3 0.003 0.012 0.027 0.952 6 0.009 0.014 0.060 0.903 12 0.010 0.015 0.071 0.886 ∞ 0.010 0.015 0.071 0.885 The response variable is the real value of the National S&P/Case Shiller index as a proxy for aggregate housing prices in the U.S. Oil supply shock refers to the oil supply measured by global oil production data collected from the U.S. Energy Information Administrate (EIA). Aggregate demand shock is tied to the global real economic activity variable obtained through the global index of dry cargo single voyage freight rates, created by Kilian (2009). Other oil-specific shock is associated with the real price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil.  Real estate specific shock is a shock in the National S&P/Case Shiller index.   
 
Figure 1 – Canada and U.S. Housing Prices with oil related variables 
 Notes: The Canadian Housing Prices is the Teranet National Bank House Price Index. U.S. Housing Prices captured by the S&P/Case Shiller Index. Oil Prices are the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) in U.S. dollars per barrel. Global Oil Production is the world oil supply expressed in billions of barrels pumped per day and averaged by month collected from the U.S. Energy Information Administrate (EIA) website. Global Real Economic Activity is obtained through the global index of dry cargo single voyage freight rates created by Kilian (2009). Kilian’s index is constructed from an equally-weighted index of percentage change growth rates of a panel of single voyage freight rates measured in dollars per metric ton. All variables are on a monthly frequency; U.S. sample covers from 1994M1 to 2015M11 and Canada sample from 1999M2 to 2015M11. Canadian and U.S. CPI indices were used to convert housing indices and oil nominal prices to real values.    
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Figure 2 – Canadian Impulse Response Functions  
Notes: The response variable is the real value National Bank House Price Index as a proxy for aggregate housing prices in the Canada. Oil supply shock is the oil supply measured by global oil production data collected from the U.S. Energy Information Administrate (EIA). Aggregate demand shock is tied to global real economic activity and is obtained through the global index of dry cargo single voyage freight rates, created by Kilian (2009). Other oil-specific shock is tied to the real price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil.  Real estate specific shock is a shock in the National Bank House Price Index.   
 
 
Figure 3 – Canadian Impulse Response Functions with Different Controls 
 Notes: See Figure 2.   
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Figure 4 – Canadian Impulse Response Functions with Restricted Dynamic Feedback 
 Notes: See Figure 2.        Figure 5 – Canadian Impulse Response Functions and Phases of the Housing Cycle 
 Notes: See Figure 2.   
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Figure 6 – U.S. Impulse Response Functions  
 Notes: The response variable is the real value of the National S&P/Case Shiller index as a proxy for aggregate housing prices in the U.S. Oil supply shock is the oil supply measured by global oil production data collected from the U.S. Energy Information Administrate (EIA). Aggregate demand shock is tied to global real economic activity and is obtained through the global index of dry cargo single voyage freight rates, created by Kilian (2009). Other oil-specific shock is tied to the real price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil.  Real estate specific shock is a shock in the National S&P/Case Shiller index.   
 
 
Figure 7 – U.S. Impulse Response Functions with Different Controls 
 Notes: See Figure 6.   
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Figure 8 – U.S. Impulse Response Functions with Restricted Dynamic Feedback 
  Notes: See Figure 6.  
 
Figure 9 – U.S. Impulse Response Functions and Phases of the Housing Cycle 
 Notes: See Figure 6.  
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